The Mind of God [antikvár]

Preface when i was a child I used to infuriate my parents by continually asking "why?" Why can't 1 go out to play? Because it might rain. Why might it rain? Because the weatherman has said so. Why has he said so? Because there are storms coming up from France. Why are there . . . ? And so on. These relentless interrogations normally ended with a desperate "Because God made it that way, and that's that!" My childhood discovery (deployed more out of boredom than philosophical acuteness) that the explanation of a fact or circumstance itself demanded an explanation, and that this chain might continue indefinitely, has troubled me ever since. Can the chain of explanation really stop somewhere, with God perhaps, or with some superlaw of nature? If so, how does this supreme explanation itself escape the need to be explained? In short, can "that" ever be "that"? When I became a university student 1 reveled in the ability of science to provide such breathtaking answers to our questions about the world. The power of science to explain things is so dazzling 1 found it easy to believe that, given the resources, all the secrets of the universe might be revealed. Yet the "why, why, why . . . ?" worry returned. What lies at the bottom of this magnificent explanatory scheme? What holds it all up? Is there an ultimate level, and if so where did that come from? Could one be satisfied with a "that's-that" explanation? In later years 1 began doing research on topics like the origin of the universe, the nature of time, and the unification of the laws of physics, and 1 found myself trespassing on territory that for centuries had been