Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age [antikvár]

1 / Introduction The process for making telecommunication pohcy in the United States often appears chaotic and disorganized, with overlapping responsibility and frequent conflicts among federal regulators, state regulators, executive branch leadership, congressional committees, and judges. Parties disappointed by the policy choices in one forum frequentiy seek redress in an alternative forum. Some decisions can only be made by the concurrence of multiple independent agencies. For example, the routine preparation of the U.S. position on issues before Intelsat is done jointly by the Federal Conununications Commission (FCC), the State Department, and the Commerce Department. Other decisions are issued independentiy by multiple agencies even though the imph-cations may be contradictory. For example, ATT and the Bell Operating Companies are subject to the orders of the FCC, the state regulatory commissions, and Judge Greene (the administrator of the ATT antitrust consent decree), with none of the three required to coordinate their actions. Observers of the telecommunication policy process have frequentiy criticized this state of affairs and have called for greater centrahzation of power and long-term planning of regulatory poHcy. Henry Geller has provided a survey of past criticisms of the telecommimication policy process that includes the following: [The FCC] has been found to have failed bodi to define its primary objective intelligendy and to make many policy determinations required for effective and expeditious administration. (1949, Hoover Commission) 3