Social Darwinism in American Thought [antikvár]

Introduction Periodically in modern history scientists have set forth new theories whose consequences go far beyond the internal development of science as a system of knowledge and far beyond such practical applications as they may happen to have. Discoveries of this magnitude shatter old beliefs and philosophies; they suggest (indeed often impose) the necessity of building new ones. They raise the promise — to some men infinitely alluring — of new and more complete syste-matizations of knowledge. They command so much interest and acquire so much prestige within the literate community that almost everyone feels obliged at the very least to bring his world-outlook into harmony with their findings, while some thinkers eagerly seize upon and enlist them in the formulation and propagation of their own views on subjects quite remote from science. The first such episode in modern times, the formulation of the Copernican system, required a major revision of cosmologies and opened up to learned men the fascinating and terrifying prospect that many long-received ideas about tJhe world might have to be drastically revised. Once again, in the Newtonian and post-Newtonian eras, mechanical models of explanation began to be widely applied to the theory of man and to political philosophy, and the ideal of a science of man and of society took on new significance. Darwinism established a new approach to nature and gave fresh impetus to the conception of development; it impelled men to try to exploit its findings and methods for the understanding of society through schemes of evolutionary development and organic analogies. In our own time the work of Freud, whose insights originated and have their surest value in the sphere of clinical psychology and in the treatment of neuroses, has