A change of pace [antikvár]

I distinctly remember our disappointment in 1992 in Hungary, when tliere was no mention of the possibility of early membership in NATO for newly emerging democracies. This was painful because we liad been excluded for such a long time from this "family". In retrospect I understand the situation better: in the early 90s the level of traditional threats was decreasing rapidly and there was nothing pressing the Alliance for immediate enlargement. IVATO and the whole of Europe were not prepared yet for this; frankly speaking we have to admit that Hungary wasn't prepared either. We still had the task of establishing a firm foundation for our democratic institutions, the financial and economic structures, as well as carrying out the defence reform. Membership in NATO evidently reinforces these institutions, but one should never forget that every single member country carries the responsibility of maintaining the strength of the Alliance. The cohesion of the Alliance may not be weakened as a result of the enlargement I myself am a reserve sergeant, with limited direct military expe- rience. During the past five years I have come to like working with the leading military authorities of the Alliance as well as the generals and officers of the Hungarian Defence Forces. Between 1993 and 1998 the Hungarian military had to have very painful reform processes. The first quantity phase finished by the end of 1997, during the course of which the headcount of the military was reduced from 160,000 to 55,000 people. We established a new, simpler structure of command, with a view to efficiency, compatibility and interoperability with NATO members, that is . the appropriate institutional and military capability of cooperation. The objective of the second phase started at the end of 1997 was to implement quality changes. This included a complete revision of our defence strategy and the modernization of our armed forces. Interoperability is high on our agenda and in this respect our involvement In the IFOR and SFOR served with priceless experiences. One of the most Important requirement for Interoperability was the capability to communicate in any of tiie two officialianguages of tlie Ailiance - Englisli or Frencii. Acinieving this is a major chaiienge across the majority of the armed forces. The above mentioned constitute a iist of tasks that extends well beyond accession, requiring significant efforts. Preparing for NATO membership is like trying to get on a moving train. While we are busy implementing our own reform steps, that Alliance itself is also changing continuously. Reforms, modernization and adaptation are dynamic processes in Hungary and will fc- P v: not finish" with our accession to the Alliance. One of the important criteria of membership is the promotion of good neighbourly relations, which we have been working on diligently during the recent years. Hungary has managed to reestablish its historic ties with the majority of her neighbours. This is not only in the interest of the relevant countries and their people but also in that ofthe whole of Europe. We are not aspiring for good neighbourly relations because NATO or the European Union demands this of us; they have to be strengthened because these J are required for national esteem and for European peace and stability. Another critical factor of adaptation in Hungary was to place the armed forces under comprehensive democratic and civilian control. From our early days of contact with NATO until our invitation to join, this was an important area of our cooperation. NATO made it evident several times - sometimes in a friendly way, other times In no uncertain terms - that this was one of the most important criteria to be fulfilled. It is very important for the Alliance to ensure that the military never - r^ r ^ poses a danger to the democratic institutions of member countries. At the same time the democratic oversight exercised by the parliament is the best way of ensuring that taxpayers' money is spent appropriately. During the course of our preparations we received well intended but tough signals too from the Alliance, not all of our debates being always free of emotions. During the course of this process we also learnt that we always have to strive for Hungarian solutions, which are in line with our traditions, views and interests. To put it more simply, we do not need to copy others; there is no single, perfect solution that can be adopted without modifications. It is not a shame to learn from the experiences of others and to take examples from models already existing. András Simonyi (The article of the author was published in NATO's publication "Sixteen Nations" in 1998.)